Matthew Pagano, Carman pagano and Milleo Pagano v. Mary P. Walker : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Matthew Pagano, Carman pagano and Milleo
Pagano v. Mary P. Walker : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
I Gordon Huggins of Huggins and Huggins; Attorneys for Appellant.
David S Kunz; Kunz, Kunz and Rechner; Attorney for Respondents.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Pagano v. Walker, No. 13864.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1048
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
DEC 9 1975 
BRi&IAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
MATTHEW PAGANO, CARMAN 
PAGANO and MILLEO PAGANO, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MARY P. WALKER, . 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
13864 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE 2nd 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE CALVIN GOULD, JUDGE PRESIDING 
KUNZ, KUNZ & RENCHER 
DAVID S. KUNZ 
#7 Bank of Utah Plaza 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Respondents 
I. GORDON HUGGINS 
First Security Building 
Suite 1101-1109 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant F I L E 0 
""•ci«CsVrt«.co»rt.0tah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PETITION FOR REHEARING . . . . 1 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . 2 
CONCLUSION 9 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Beaty v. Guggenheim Exploration Company, 
225 NY 380, 386, 122 NE 378 (1919) . . . . . . 3 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 259 NY 458, 467, 
NE 545, 62 ALR 1 (1928) 3 
Hawkins v. Perry, 123, Utah 16, 253 P2 . . . . . . 8 
Haws v. Jensen, 110 Utah 212, 209 P2 229 8 
Jovkieh v. Badaglicco, 170 P2 984 8 
Sacre v. Sacre, 55 A2 592, 173 ALR 1261, 1271. . . . 9 
TEXTS 
A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Trusts 
Chapter 12, P. 160 . . . . 1 
A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 
Sections 1 & 2 and Sections 404-460 . . . . . . 7 
A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Restitution, 
Sec. 160 and Sec. 190 6 
Vol. 76 Am. Jur 2d, Sec. 236 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW PAGANO, CARMEN 
PAGANO, and MILLED PAGANO, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Case No. 13864 
vs. : 
MARY P. WALKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The trial court based its decision upon:-the remedial and 
equitable principles of constructive trust and recognized the 
following principles set forth in the introductory note to 
Chapter 12 of the American Law Institute Restatement of Trusts 
Page 
"A constructive trust is imposed, not because of the 
intention of the parties, but because the person holding 
title would profit by a wrong and would be unjustly 
enriched if permitted to keep the property. A constructive 
trust, unlike an express trust or resulting trust, is 
remedial in character." (See Restatement of Restitution, 
160.) 
The majority of the Supreme Court erred in that it did not 
recognize the foregoing fundamental difference between a 
constructive trust and an express trust. The opinion held that 
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the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Plaintiffs 
should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the 
Defendant for the following reasons: 
1. That Plaintiff is required to prove that it was the 
intention of the settlor to create a trust at the time of 
the opening of the joint accounts. 
2. That the terms of the trust created by the settlor 
must be set forth with certainty. 
ARGUMENT . . 
If the theory upon which the Plaintiffs sought relief and 
the trial court granted relief was that Mary was the Trustee 
and the Plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of an express trust 
then a reversal would be in order. But the case before the court 
is not one to enforce an express trust, and it should not be 
judged on the standards required to establish or to enforce an 
express trust. The Plaintiffs seek relief in equity to establish 
a constructive trust — to call into play the equitable powers 
of the court to prevent an unjust enrichment. 
The opinion recites that the trial court found, on the 
basis of clear and convincing evidence, that Mary Walker had 
made the following statement regarding the bank accounts in 
issue: 
"Mother told me to pay her bills, keep a little 
out for my arthritis and divide up the rest." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The court's opinion states that: 
"Even if the statement had been in writing, 
signed by the mother, Lucy, there is doubt 
that it should properly be regarded as sufficiently 
specific to meet the requirements for the establish-
ment of a trust for Plaintiff's benefit." 
This statement shows that in reviewing this case the 
court examined the evidence in the light of requiring the 
Plaintiffs to produce evidence that would support the establish-
ment of an express trust rather than evidence that would support 
a constructive trust, which was the standard applied by the 
trial court. The remedial character of the constructive trust 
is defined by Chief Judge Cardozo in cases decided by the Court 
of Appeals of New York: 
"A constructive trust is the formula which the 
conscience of equity finds expression. Where property 
• has been acquired under circumstances that the holder 
of legal title may not in good conscience retain the 
beneficial interest equity converts him into a 
trustee." 
Beaty v. Guggenheim Exploration 
Company, 225 NY 380, 386, 
122 NE 378 (1919) 
"A constructive trust is then the remedial device 
through which preference of self is made subordinate 
to loyalty to others." 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 259 NY 458, 
467 NE 545, 62 ALRl (1928) 
The claim of vagueness in Lucy's instruction to Mary regardin< 
her savings account must be considered in the light of all the 
circumstances rather than in the light of how would Lucy have 
said it had she been a lawyer. The statement was made by Mary 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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at a time when she and her brothers were discussing the specific 
bank accounts in issue. The only persons concerned with these 
accounts were Mary and her brothers Matthew, Carmen and Milleo. 
All persons present knew that when she spoke directly to them 
and said divide, that she meant divide the funds with them not 
some stranger or collateral relative. They were all of Lucy's 
children. What was to be divided by Mary in accordance with 
Lucy's instruction? It was what was left after Lucy's debts were 
paid and Mary had kept a little out for her arthritis. 
When Mary repudiated her Mother's instructions and determined 
to keep all of the funds for herself, she puts her brothers in 
a position where the only remedy available to them was the power 
of the equity court. The real issue is: Is the court powerless 
to prevent Mary from unjustly enriching herself by her own 
wrongdoing? 
The general rule concerning the acquisition of property 
by a fiduciary is set forth in Sec. 190 of the American Law 
Institute of the Restatement of Restitution: 
"Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another 
acquires property, and the acquisition or retention 
of the property is in violation of his duty as fiduciary, 
he holds it upon a constructive trust for the other." 
The evidence in this case was clear and without dispute 
that Mary was in a confidential relationship to her mother, 
Lucy. There is no evidence that Mary abused this confidential 
relationship during the lifetime of her mother; therefore, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that Lucy would believe that the simples 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and most inexpensive way to distribute the bulk of her estate 
would be to rely on Mary to carry out her instruction to divide 
the funds accumulated by her and her husband in a lifetime of 
work with her children. 
In an effort to clarify the Plaintiffs1 position, which 
was apparently not made clear to the court, let us take the 
position that Mary and Lucy were in a fiduciary relationship, 
and further assume that in this fiduciary relationship Lucy 
told Mary at a time when Lucy and Mary were discussing the 
funds in the joint accounts: 
"(Mary when I am gone) I want you to pay my bills, 
keep a little out for your arthritis, and divide 
the rest (with your brothers)." 
And let us further assume that the above conversation has 
been admitted - rather than as in this case, found by the court 
upon clear and convincing evidence. Then let us further assume 
that Mary admitted this conversation at a time when she and her 
brothers met to discuss their mother's estate and to agree upon 
an administrator with the will annexed. Assume further that after 
Mary had admitted she made such a statement that she then said, 
"I will divide the money up if there isn't any 
trouble." (Tr. 124) . 
And assume further that at a later time she said: 
"And furthermore I have decided not to divide the 
money and I won't have a guilty conscience about 
it—it's mine." (Tr 15) 
Under such fact circumstances would this court have any 
difficulty coming to the conclusion that when Mary said she was 
not going to divide the money (in this case over $74,000.00) and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was going to keep the entire amount for herself that she would 
be unjustly enriched if the court permitted her to retain the 
entire sum? 
The illustrative fact situation set forth above is a 
reasonable interpretation of the legal result of the finding of 
the trial court based on the standard of clear and convincing 
evidence. 
The law applicable to such a fact situation is not the law 
applicable to an express trust but is the law applicable to a 
constructive trust as defined in Sec. 160 of the American Law 
Institute Restatement of the Law of Restitution: 
Sec. 160. Constructive Trust. 
Where a person holding title to property is subject to 
an equitable duty to convey it to another on the 
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were 
permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises. 
Comment: 
a. Constructive trust and express trust. The term 
"Constructive trust" is not altogether a felicitous 
one. It might be thought to suggest the idea that 
it is a fiduciary relation similar to an express trust, 
whereas it is in fact something quite different from an 
express trust. An express trust and a constructive 
trust are not divisions of the same fundamental concept. 
They are not species of the same genus. They are 
distinct concepts. A constructive trust does not, 
like an express trust, arise because of a manifestation 
of an intention to create it but it is imposed as 
a remedy to reprevent unjust enrichment. A constructive 
trust,.unlike an express trust, is not a fiduciary 
relation, although the circumstances which give rise 
to a constructive trust may or may not involve a 
fiduciary relation. 
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It is true that both in the case of an express trust 
and in that of a constructive trust one person holds 
the title to property subject to an equitable duty to 
hold the property for or to convey it to another and 
the latter has in each case some kind of an equitable 
interest in the property. In other respects, however, 
there is little resemblance between the two relationships. 
An attempt to define a trust in such a way as to include 
constructive trusts as well as express trusts is futile, 
since a single definition which would include such distinct 
ideas would be so general as to be useless. A constructive 
trust differs from an express trust in much the same way 
a quasi-contractual obligation differs from a contractual 
obligation. On the other hand, a quasi-contractual 
obligation and a constructive trust closely resemble each 
other, the chief difference being that the Plaintiff in 
bringing an action to enforce a quasi-contractual obliga-
tion seeks to obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal 
liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money, whereas 
the Plaintiff in bringing a suit to enforce a constructive 
trust seeks to recover specific property. For these reasons 
Constructive Trusts are dealt with together with Quasi 
Contracts in the Restatement of this Subject. Constructive 
trusts are not dealt with in the Restatement of Trusts, 
except in so far as they arise out of express trusts or 
attempts to create express trusts. 
The term "trust", when not modified by an adjective, is in 
the Restatement of this Subject confined to express trusts 
(see Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 1, 2) . 
b. Constructive trust and resulting trust. A constructive 
trust is also to be distinguished from a resulting trust. 
A resulting trust arises where a transfer of property is 
made under circumstances which raise an inference that the 
person making the transfer or causing it to be made did not 
intend the transferee to have the beneficial interest in the 
property transferred. A constructive trust is imposed not 
because of the intention of the parties but because the 
person would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to 
keep the property. The Trustee of a resulting trust, like 
the Trustee of an express trust, is in a fiduciary relation 
to the beneficiary of the trust. (See Restatement of Trusts, 
Sees. 404-460). 
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c. Unjust enrichment. A constructive trust is 
imposed upon a person in order to prevent his unjust 
enrichment. To prevent such unjust enrichment an 
equitable duty to convey the property to another is 
imposed upon him. There are many situations in which 
a person holding title to property is subject to an 
equitable duty to convey it to another. * * * 
d. Unjust enrichment and unjust deprivation. In most 
cases where a constructive trust is imposed the result 
is to restore to the plaintiff property of which he 
has been deprived and to take from the defendant property 
the retention of which by him would result in a 
corresponding unjust enrichment of the defendant; in 
other words, the effect is to prevent a loss to the 
Plaintiff and a corresponding gain to the defendant, 
and to put each of them in the position in which he 
was before the defendant acquired the property. 
The Utah cases of Hawkins v. Perry, 123, Utah 16, 253 P2 
372, and Haws v. Jensen, 110 Utah 212, 209 P2 229, and the 
California case of Jovkieh v. Badaglicco, 170 P2 984, set forth 
in detail on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 of Respondent's brief, are 
all cases which recognize and apply the equity principles herein 
set forth in a manner consistant with Respondent's position. 
A constructive trust also differs from an express trust in 
the fact that since the constructive trust is a remedial feature 
of the law of equity, it can be imposed at any time the court is 
satisfied that the equitable requirements have been met. Vol. 76 
Am. Jur 2d Trusts states the rule as follows: 
"Sec. 236. Where confidential relationship is present. 
A constructive trust arises where a conveyance is 
induced on the agreement of a fiduciary or confidant 
to hold in trust for a reconveyance or other purpose, 
where the fiduciary or confidential relationship is 
one upon which the grantor justifiably can and does 
rely and where the agreement is breached, since the 
breach of the agreement is an abuse of the confidence, 
and to establish such a trust it is not necessary to 
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show fraud or intent not to perform the agreement 
when it was made. The tendency of the courts is to 
construe the term "confidence" or "confidential 
relationship" liberally in favor of the confider and 
against the confidant, for the purpose of raising a 
constructive trust on a violation or betrayal thereof. 
A parent and child, grandparent and child, or brother 
and sister relationship is not intrinsically one of 
confidence, but under certain circumstances involves a 
confidence and abuse of which gives rise to a construc-
tive trust in accordance with the terms of an agreement 
or promise of a grantee to hold in trust or to 
reconvey." 
In the case of Sacre v. Sacre, 55 A2 592,173 ALR 1261, 1271, 
the court held: 
"Whenever two persons stand in such a relation 
that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily 
reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows 
out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and 
this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted 
to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding 
party, the person so availing himself of his position 
will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although 
the transaction would not have been impeached if no such 
confidential relation had existed." 
CONCLUSION 
The court's opinion totally emasculates the equitable 
principal of unjust enrichment and constructive trust in respect 
to a joint account. The opinion opens the door to use the joint 
account as a vehicle of fraud and unjust enrichment. 
The court adopts a rule that sets the following precedent: 
Even if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that 
the surviving joint tenant agreed with the person who supplied all 
the funds to the joint account to distribute the proceeds in 
accordance with directions given by the person who supplied the funds 
then, because the claimant has not proved all the elements to 
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establish an express trust, the surviving party to the joint 
account may disregard his agreement and retain the funds by virtue 
of the fact he is holder of the legal title. 
The court's opinion refuses to recognize the historical 
powers of the chancery or equity court to hold the surviving member 
of the joint account to his equitable duty, and further permits 
such survivor to enrich himself by his own breach of duty. 
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing errors 
justify the court in granting a re-hearing and re-examining this 
case in the light of the equitable principles of unjust enrichment 
and constructive trust. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KUNZ, KUNZ & RENCHER 
DAVID S. KUNZ 
#7 Bank of Utah Plaza 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Respondents 
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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The trial court based its decision upon:1 the remedial and 
equitable principles of constructive trust and recognized the 
following principles set forth in the introductory note to 
Chapter 12 of the American Law Institute Restatement of Trusts 
Page 
"A constructive trust is imposed/ not because of the 
intention of the parties, but because the person holding 
title would profit by a wrong and would be unjustly 
enriched if permitted to keep the property. A constructive 
trust, unlike an express trust or resulting trust, is 
remedial in character." (See Restatement of Restitution, 
160.) 
The majority of the Supreme Court erred in that it did not 
recognize the foregoing fundamental difference between a 
constructive trust and an express trust. The opinion held that 
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the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Plaintiffs 
should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the 
Defendant for the following reasons: 
1. That Plaintiff is required to prove that it was the 
intention of the settlor to create a trust at the time of 
the opening of the joint accounts. 
2. That the terms of the trust created by the settlor 
must be set forth with certainty. 
ARGUMENT . . 
If the theory upon which the Plaintiffs sought relief and 
the trial court granted relief was that Mary was the Trustee 
and the Plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of an express trust 
then a reversal would be in order. But the case before the court 
is not one to enforce an express trust, and it should not be 
judged on the standards required to establish or to enforce an 
express trust. The Plaintiffs seek relief in equity to establish 
a constructive trust — to call into play the equitable powers 
of the court to prevent an unjust enrichment. 
The opinion recites that the trial court found, on the 
basis of clear and convincing evidence, that Mary Walker had 
made the following statement regarding the bank accounts in 
issue: 
"Mother told me to pay her bills, keep a little 
out for my arthritis and divide up the rest." 
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The court's opinion states that: 
"Even if the statement had been in writing, 
signed by the mother, Lucy, there is doubt 
that it should properly be regarded as sufficiently 
specific to meet the requirements for the establish-
ment of a trust for Plaintiff's benefit." 
This statement shows that in reviewing this case the 
court examined the evidence in the light of requiring the 
Plaintiffs to produce evidence that would support the establish-
ment of an express trust rather than evidence that would support 
a constructive trust, which was the standard applied by the 
trial court. The remedial character of the constructive trust 
is defined by Chief Judge Cardozo in cases decided by the Court 
of Appeals of New York: 
"A constructive trust is the formula which the 
conscience of equity finds expression. Where property 
has been acquired under circumstances that the holder 
of legal title may not in good conscience retain the 
beneficial interest equity converts him into a 
trustee." 
Beaty v. Guggenheim Exploration 
Company, 225 NY 380, 386, 
122 NE 378 (1919) 
"A constructive trust is then the remedial device 
through which preference of self is made subordinate 
to loyalty to others." 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 259 NY 458, 
467 NE 545, 62 ALR 1 (1928) 
The claim of vagueness in Lucy's instruction to Mary regarding 
her savings account must be considered in the light of all the 
circumstances rather than in the light of how would Lucy have 
said it had she been a lawyer. The statement was made by Mary 
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at a time when she and her brothers were discussing the specific 
bank accounts in issue* The only persons concerned with these 
accounts were Mary and her brothers Matthew, Carmen and Milleo. 
All persons present knew that when she spoke directly to them 
and said divide, that she meant divide the funds with them not 
some stranger or collateral relative. They were all of Lucy's 
children. What was to be divided by Mary in accordance with 
Lucy's instruction? It was what was left after Lucy's debts were 
paid and Mary had kept a little out for her arthritis. 
When Mary repudiated her Mother's instructions and determined 
to keep all of the funds for herself, she puts her brothers in 
a position where the only remedy available to them was the power 
of the equity court. The real issue is: Is the court powerless 
to prevent Mary from unjustly enriching herself by her own 
wrongdoing? 
The general rule concerning the acquisition of property 
by a fiduciary is set forth in Sec. 190 of the American Law 
Institute of the Restatement of Restitution: 
"Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another 
acquires property, and the acquisition or retention 
of the property is in violation of his duty as fiduciary, 
he holds it upon a constructive trust for the other." 
The evidence in this case was clear and without dispute 
that Mary was in a confidential relationship to her mother, 
Lucy. There is no evidence that Mary abused this confidential 
relationship during the lifetime of her mother; therefore, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that Lucy would believe that the simplest 
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and most inexpensive way to distribute the bulk of her estate 
would be to rely on Mary to carry out her instruction to divide 
the funds accumulated by her and her husband in a lifetime of 
work with her children. 
In an effort to clarify the Plaintiffs1 position, which 
was apparently not made clear to the court, let us take the 
position that Mary and Lucy were in a fiduciary relationship, 
and further assume that in this fiduciary relationship Lucy 
told Mary at a time when Lucy and Mary were discussing the 
funds in the joint accounts: 
11
 (Mary when I am gone) I want you to pay my bills, 
keep a little out for your arthritis, and divide 
the rest (with your brothers).11 
And let us further assume that the above conversation has 
been admitted - rather than as in this case, found by the court 
upon clear and convincing evidence. Then let us further assume 
that Mary admitted this conversation at a time when she and her 
brothers met to discuss their mother's estate and to agree upon 
an administrator with the will annexed. Assume further that after 
Mary had admitted she made such a statement that she then said, 
"I will divide the money up if there isn't any 
trouble." (Tr. 124). 
And assume further that at a later time she said: 
"And furthermore I have decided not to divide the 
money and I won't have a guilty conscience about 
it—it's mine." (Tr 15) 
Under such fact circumstances would this court have any 
difficulty coming to the conclusion that when Mary said she was 
not going to divide the money (in this case over $74,000.00) and 
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was going to keep the entire amount for herself that she would 
be unjustly enriched if the court permitted her to retain the 
entire sum? 
The illustrative fact situation set forth above is a 
reasonable interpretation of the legal result of the finding of 
the trial court based on the standard of clear and convincing 
evidence. 
The law applicable to such a fact situation is not the law 
applicable to an express trust but is the law applicable to a 
constructive trust as defined in Sec. 160 of the American Law 
Institute Restatement of the Law of Restitution: 
Sec. 160. Constructive Trust. 
Where a person holding title to property is subject to 
an equitable duty to convey it to another on the 
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were 
permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises. 
Comment: 
a. Constructive trust and express trust. The term 
"Constructive trust" is not altogether a felicitous 
one. It might be thought to suggest the idea that 
it is a fiduciary relation similar to an express trust, 
whereas it is in fact something quite different from an 
express trust. An express trust and a constructive 
trust are not divisions of the same fundamental concept. 
They are not species of the same genus. They are 
distinct concepts. A constructive trust does not, 
• like an express trust, arise because of a manifestation 
of an intention to create it but it is imposed as 
a remedy to reprevent unjust enrichment. A constructive 
trust,, unlike .an express trust, is not a fiduciary 
relation, although the circumstances which give rise 
to a constructive trust may or may not involve a 
fiduciary relation. 
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It is true that both in the case of an express trust 
and in that of a constructive trust one person holds 
the title to property subject to an equitable duty to 
hold the property for or to convey it to another and 
the latter has in each case some kind of an equitable 
interest in the property. In other respects, however, 
there is little resemblance between the two relationships. 
An attempt to define a trust in such a way as to include 
constructive trusts as well as express trusts is futile, 
since a single definition which would include such distinct 
ideas would be so general as to be useless. A constructive 
trust differs from an express trust in much the same way 
a quasi-contractual obligation differs from a contractual 
obligation. On the other hand, a quasi-contractual 
obligation and a constructive trust closely resemble each 
other, the chief difference being that the Plaintiff in 
bringing an action to enforce a quasi-contractual obliga-
tion seeks to obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal 
liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money, whereas 
the Plaintiff in bringing a suit to enforce a constructive 
trust seeks to recover specific property. For these reasons 
Constructive Trusts are dealt with together with Quasi 
Contracts in the Restatement of this Subject. Constructive 
trusts are not dealt with in the Restatement of Trusts, 
except in so far as they arise out of express trusts or 
attempts to create express trusts. 
The term "trust", when not modified by an adjective, is in 
the Restatement of this Subject confined to express trusts 
(see Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 1, 2). 
b. Constructive trust and resulting trust. A constructive 
trust is also to be distinguished from a resulting trust. 
A resulting trust arises where a transfer of property is 
made under circumstances which raise an inference that the 
person making the transfer or causing it to be made did not 
intend the transferee to have the beneficial interest in the 
property transferred. A constructive trust is imposed not 
because of the intention of the parties but because the 
person would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to 
keep the property. The Trustee of a resulting trust, like 
the Trustee of an express trust, is in a fiduciary relation 
to the beneficiary of the trust. (See Restatement of Trusts, 
Sees. 404-460). 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 8 
c. Unjust enrichment. A constructive trust is 
imposed upon a person in order to prevent his unjust 
enrichment. To prevent such unjust enrichment an 
equitable duty to convey the property to another is 
imposed upon him. There are many situations in which 
a person holding title to property is subject to an 
equitable duty to convey it to another. * * * 
d. Unjust enrichment and unjust deprivation. In most 
cases where a constructive trust is imposed the result 
is to restore to the plaintiff property of which he 
has been deprived and to take from the defendant property 
the retention of which by him would result in a 
corresponding unjust enrichment of the defendant; in 
other words, the effect is to prevent a loss to the 
Plaintiff and a corresponding gain to the defendant, 
and to put each of them in the position in which he 
was before the defendant acquired the property. 
The Utah cases of Hawkins v. Perry, 123, Utah 16, 253 P2 
372, and Haws v. Jensen, 110 Utah 212, 209 P2 229, and the 
California case of Jovkieh v. Badaglicco, 170 P~ 984, set forth 
in detail on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 of Respondent's brief, are 
all cases which recognize and apply the equity principles herein 
set forth in a manner consistant with Respondent's position. 
A constructive trust also differs from an express trust in 
the fact that since the constructive trust is a remedial feature 
of the law of equity, it can be imposed at any time the court is 
satisfied that the equitable requirements have been met. Vol. 76 
Am. Jur 2d Trusts states the rule as follows: 
"Sec. 236. Where confidential relationship is present. 
A constructive trust arises where a conveyance is 
induced on the agreement of a fiduciary or confidant 
to hold in trust for a reconveyance or other purpose, 
where the fiduciary or confidential relationship is 
one upon which the grantor justifiably can and does 
rely and where the agreement is breached, since the 
breach of the agreement is an abuse of the confidence, 
and to establish such a trust it is not necessary to 
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show fraud or intent not to perform the agreement 
when it was made. The tendency of the courts is to 
construe the term "confidence" or "confidential 
relationship" liberally in favor of the confider and 
against the confidant, for the purpose of raising a. 
constructive trust on a violation or betrayal thereof. 
A parent and child, grandparent and child, or brother 
and sister relationship is not intrinsically one of 
confidence, but under certain circumstances involves a 
confidence and abuse of which gives rise to a construc-
tive trust in accordance with the terms of an agreement 
or promise of a grantee to hold in trust or to 
reconvey." 
In the case of Sacre v. Sacre, 55 A2 592,173 ALR 1261, 1271, 
the court held: 
"Whenever two persons stand in such a relation 
that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily 
reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows 
out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and 
this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted 
to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding 
party, the person so availing himself of his position 
will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although 
the transaction would not have been impeached if no such 
confidential relation had existed." 
CONCLUSION 
The court's opinion totally emasculates the equitable 
principal of unjust enrichment and constructive trust in respect 
to a joint account. The opinion opens the door to use the joint 
account as a vehicle of fraud and unjust enrichment. 
The court adopts a rule that sets the following precedent: 
Even if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that 
the surviving joint tenant agreed with the person who supplied all 
the funds to the joint account to distribute the proceeds in 
accordance with directions given by the person who supplied the funds 
then, because the claimant has not proved all the elements to 
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establish an express trust, the surviving party to the joint 
account may disregard his agreement and retain the funds by virtue 
of the fact he is holder of the legal title. 
The court's opinion refuses to recognize the historical 
powers of the chancery or equity court to hold the surviving member 
of the joint account to his equitable dutyf and further permits 
such survivor to enrich himself by his own breach of duty* 
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing errors 
justify the court in granting a re-hearing and re-examining this 
case in the light of the equitable principles of unjust enrichment 
and constructive trust. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KUNZ, KUNZ & RENCHER 
DAVID S. KUNZ 
#7 Bank of Utah Plaza 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Respondents 
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